Phishing email
The email copies the look of a familiar service and leads to a fake sign in page. The login and password go to the attacker while the employee sees a familiar form.
Check the full sender address and the link domain before clicking.
Most leaks start with an ordinary email or phone call, not with a broken system. This page collects what actually protects a company account and its money.
It is easier for an attacker to talk an employee into something than to break technical protection. Each of these tricks relies on haste and trust, not on a weak system.
Six scenarios company employees run into most often.
The email copies the look of a familiar service and leads to a fake sign in page. The login and password go to the attacker while the employee sees a familiar form.
Check the full sender address and the link domain before clicking.
The caller claims to be the bank or the IT team, rushes you and asks for the code from a message. A real security team never asks for codes or passwords.
Hang up and call back using the number from the official website.
An invoice is swapped inside the thread: the email arrives from a lookalike domain and reads as a continuation of the discussion. The money goes to someone else account.
Confirm any change of payment details by phone, not in the thread.
A document with macros or an archive with an executable starts an encryption program. Files on the computer and in the shared folder become unavailable.
Never enable macros in documents from external emails.
Signing in from a personal or shared computer leaves an active session behind. The next person at that computer gets access to the data.
End the session explicitly instead of just closing the tab.
Someone messages you in a chat app claiming to be the director or the CFO: the account is new or just shares the name, the tone is urgent, and they ask you to transfer money or send documents right away. It relies on staff being afraid to double check with management.
Confirm any urgent transfer request by calling a known number.
A short list worth passing on to every employee.
The work account password must not be reused anywhere. A leak on a third party site should not open the company documents.
One password is not enough. A second factor stops a sign in even with the correct password if it has leaked.
A signed document cannot be altered unnoticed. A scanned signature in an email confirms nothing.
An employee gets access only to the data required for the job. When they leave, access is revoked in one place.
Most mass infections exploit vulnerabilities that were closed months ago. A postponed update is an open door.
A change of bank details is confirmed by voice on a known number. That is one minute against a lost payment.
Part of the protection should not depend on how attentive an employee is. It is built into the products.
What to do when you suspect a compromise.
Start with the work account, then the mailbox. If the password was reused, change it on the other services too.
In the account settings close every active session except the current one. That throws the attacker out of the system.
Warn the IT team and the accounting department. The sooner they know, the higher the chance of stopping a payment.
If the suspicion concerns A3 products, write to the support address. We will check the logs and help close the access.
We will look at how access to systems is arranged today and suggest what to close first.